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Abstract 
 
Malaysia is experiencing another round of crisis brought about by the global credit 
crunch. With the impending weaker economy, the resiliency of Malaysian banking 
sector would again be tested. This paper will gain insights into the performance of 
Malaysian local banks after the consolidation of banking sector in year 2000 which 
was expedited by the Asian Financial crisis. The objective of this paper is to find out 
whether the local banks have achieved performance efficiency during the post merger 
period namely in the areas of profitability, cost savings and shareholders’ wealth.  
Comparison and analysis of ratios are used to compare the performance of local banks 
during the pre-merger period (1999-2000) and post-merger period (2006-2007). 
Banks’ mergers in Malaysia do not necessary improve their profitability as measured 
by return on asset (ROA). Cost savings as measured by expenses to revenue ratio 
indicated mixed result whereas almost all the banks had shown improvement in 
expenses to asset ratio. Most of the banks had improved in shareholders wealth. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Another round of crisis  
 
Malaysia is experiencing another round of crisis brought about by the global credit 
crunch. The crisis has directly impact the world major economies namely America 
and European Union countries. Malaysia is now facing the contagion effect such as 
reduction in commodities prices, declined in trade (import & export) activities, exodus 
of foreign funds from share market, rising unemployment and risk of recession. With 
the impending weaker economy, the resiliency of Malaysian banking sector would 
again be tested. Some banks in US and European Union countries are already mulling 
the idea of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in order to weather the crisis. In a recent 
study conducted by global management consultancy Arthur D. Little1, it was predicted 
that within the next three years, ten of today’s top fifty European banks would 
disappear due to consolidation. 
 
1.2 Consolidation of Malaysian banking industry 
 
Malaysian banking sector faced a major consolidation in 2000, mainly due to the 
aftermath of 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Growing non-performing loans, 
vulnerabilities of smaller financial institutions and inherent weakness in the banking 
systems to contain the effect of financial crisis are some of the major reasons. In 
addition, there were increased pressures to liberalise the financial services in Malaysia 
from year 2003 under an agreement with World Trade Organization. On 29 July 1999, 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) announced the consolidation of 54 financial 
institutions under six anchor banks namely Maybank, Bumiputra Commerce Bank, 
Public Bank, Perwira Affin Bank, Multi-Purpose Bank and Southern Bank. The 
planned consolidation was met with objections from various quarters and eventually 
BNM extended the number of anchor banks to ten banks. On 14 February 2000, BNM 
announced the 10 anchor banks which are depicted below: 
 
                                               
1
 Arthur D. Little, founded in 1886, is a leading global management consulting firm that links strategy, 
innovation and technology to master complex business challenges while delivering sustainable results 
to their clients. 
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 Banking Institutions in the Group 
Acquirers Subsidiaries Targets 
Alliance Bank Malaysia Bhd - Sabah Bank Bhd  
International Bank Malaysia Bhd 
Bolton Finance Bhd 
Sabah Finance Bhd 
Bumiputra Merchant Bankers Bhd 
Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd 
Am Bank (M) Bhd Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd MBF Finance Bhd 
Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Bhd Bumiputra-Commerce 
Finance Bhd 
Commerce International Merchant 
Bankers Bhd 
Bank Bumiputra 
EON Bank Bhd EON Finance Bhd Oriental Bank Bhd 
City Finance Bhd 
Perkasa Finance Bhd 
Malaysian International Merchant 
Bankers Bhd 
Hong Leong Bank Bhd Hong Leong Finance Bhd Wah Tat Bank Bhd 
Credit Corporation (M) Bhd 
Malayan Banking Group Mayban Finance Bhd 
Aseambankers Malaysia Bhd 
PhileoAllied Bank Bhd 
The Pacific Bank Bhd 
Sime Finance Bhd 
Kewangan Bersatu Bhd 
Perwira Affin Bank Bhd Affin Finance Bhd 
Perwira Affin Merchant Bank 
Bhd 
BSN Commercial Bank Bhd 
BSN Finance Bhd 
Asia Commercial Finance Bhd 
BSN Merchant Bank Bhd 
Public Bank Bhd Public Finance Berhad Hock Hua Bank Bhd 
Advance Finance Bhd 
Sime Merchant Bankers Bhd 
RHB Bank Bhd RHB Sakura Merchant 
Bankers Bhd 
Bank Utama (Malaysia) Bhd 
Delta Finance Bhd 
Interfinance Bhd 
Southern Bank Bhd Southern Finance Company 
Bhd / Southern Investment 
Bank Bhd 
Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd 
Cempaka Finance Bhd 
Perdana Finance Bhd 
United Merchant Finance Bhd 
Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd 
Source : Dr Rubi Ahmad, 2007 
 
The completion of the exercise was set for December 2002. Merged banks were 
required to have a minimum capital of RM2 billion by 31 December 2001. But the 
deadline was later extended to 30 June 2002. The banks were also required to have an 
asset base of RM25 billion. The banking consolidation to ten anchor banks was 
completed by mid 2002 with the final merger between RHB Bank Bhd and Bank 
Utama (M) Bhd. 
 
1.3  Motivation of study 
 
Having the advantage of larger assets and capital base, the merged banks are expected 
to achieve synergies, have greater operational efficiency and better prepared to face 
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challenges from liberalisation of the banking industry. Operational efficiency could 
result in cost saving and improvement in banks’ profitability. The cost savings could 
be fully realised within 2 to 3 years and a longer period should provide a better picture 
(Rubi Ahmad, 2007). Banks were urged to merge during Asian economic crisis 
because policy makers in Asia believed that merging two weak banks creates a 
healthier bank than both predecessor banks and merging a weak bank with a healthier 
bank one reduces the chance of a bank failure (Shih, 2003). 
 
However, past empirical researches of M&As activities in the banking sector in the 
had indicated mixed results. Lin et al (2006), Berger et al (1999), Vernet (1996), 
Knapp et al (2006) and Diaz et al (2004) found that M&As can increase the 
profitability of merged banks. Pillof & Santomero (1996) commented there was no 
statistically significant gain in value or performance from merger activity while Amel 
et al (2004) found no clear evidence that M&As would result in cost reduction.   
 
Malaysian banking industry was consolidated in a large scale post Asian Financial 
Crisis. As opposed to M&As in US and European countries whereby M&As were 
motivated by increasing market power or improving efficiency, the consolidation in 
Malaysian banking industry was driven and led by government. Prior to this 1999-
2002 merger exercise, empirical studies on Malaysian financial institutions were 
scarce owing to rarity of mergers and acquisitions activities in the banking industry 
(Rubi Ahmad, 2004). Even if mergers do exist, the scale is not comparable to the 
1999 to 2002 merger exercise. It will be interesting to study the performance 
efficiency of the merged banks as the mergers activities were done at the same time 
and all the banks were experiencing similar economic conditions. Perhaps, the 
differences were the management style and business strategies adopted by respective 
banks’ management teams. 
 
The problem statement in this study is the post-merger efficiency in Malaysian local 
banks by analysing their performance after the major consolidation of banking sector 
in year 2000. Though banks consolidation has taken place for eight years, there is no 
clear evidence to prove the effectiveness of bank mergers. However, there were two 
studies conducted by Krishnasamy et al (2003) and Sufian (2004). Both used Data 
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Envelopment Analysis (DEA)2 and found that merged banks gained overall efficiency 
post merger. The methodology of this paper will be different from them, in which 
preliminary analysis will be carried out based on financial performance indicators or 
financial ratios.  
 
1.4 Objective  
 
The objective of this paper here is to find out whether Malaysian local banks have 
achieved performance efficiency in the post-merger period namely in the areas of 
profitability, cost savings and shareholders’ wealth. In the case of banks’ 
consolidation in Malaysia, the merging parties were not allowed to retrench 
employees for 2 years after the merger exercise was completed (Rubi Ahmad, 2007). 
Analysts were interested in the post-merger effects on loan growth, cost savings 
achieved, post-merger staff retrenchment, enhancement of return on equity and time 
lag for completion of mergers (Bala Shanmugam, 2003)  
 
Campa & Hernando (2006) commented that merged banks are supposedly capable of 
improving operating costs by rationalization the branch network of merging banks, 
reducing back-office operations and common services, and achieve economies of 
scale in information technology, brand recognition and other fixed assets. Mergers 
also allow banks to improve their market positioning in the overall market and 
increase cross-selling of financial products. Amel et al (2004) supported that M&As 
can improve efficiency by gaining access to cost-saving technologies or spread their 
fixed costs over a larger base. Efficiency gains may derive from exploitation of 
economies of scope, allowing merging parties to enter new markets and cross-sell 
products to a wider customer base.   
 
Berger et al (1999) contended that the primary motive for consolidation in financial 
services is to maximise shareholders’ value via increasing market power or increasing 
efficiency. A number of studies have found that in a substantial proportion of M&As, 
                                               
2
 Data envelopment analysis (DEA), also known as frontier analysis was first introduced by Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes in 1978. It is a performance measurement technique which is used for evaluating 
the relative efficiency of decision-making units (DMU's) in organisations. 
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a larger and more efficient institutions tends to take over a smaller, less efficient 
institutions.   
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Rhoades (1998) studied nine large bank mergers occurred since the mid-to-late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The key findings were: (1) significant cost cutting objectives were 
achieved; (2) four of the nine mergers showed clearly efficiency gains and (3) seven 
of the nine mergers exhibited improvement in return on assets. All the merged firms 
indicated that actual savings met or exceeded their expectations. Most of the firms 
projected that cost savings would be fully achieved within three years after merger.  
 
Lin et al (2006) found that merger and acquisitions (M&As) in US banking firms 
increased firms’ performance. M&As can be an effective growth strategy for banking 
firms. Most banking mergers can contribute to firm productivity, shareholders value 
and profitability. Campa & Hernando (2006) evaluated the performance record of 
M&As that took place in the European Union financial industry during the period 
1998-2002. They found that M&As usually involved targets with lower operating 
performance than their average in their sector. Target banks showed significant 
improvement in return-on-equity and net financial margin. These improvements were 
noted after two years the transactions were completed.   
 
Vennet (1996) found that domestic merger among equal-sized partners significantly 
increase the performance of merged banks. This type of merger provides ample 
opportunities to reduce redundancies and exploit synergies, and thus raised the 
operational efficiency and profit level of the merged banks. The study was conducted 
based on 422 domestic banks takeovers in ten European countries.   
 
Berger et al (1999) reviewed more than 250 references in the context of financial 
services industry consolidation and found that consolidation appears to increase profit 
efficiency. There was little or no cost efficiency improvement on average following 
M&As. Consolidations involving inefficient firms appeared to improve both cost and 
profit efficiency as the M&A event may have “woken up” management to the need 
for improvement. 
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Krishnasamy et al (2003) examined the changes in productivity of the merged 10 
Malaysian banks in the period of 2000 and 2001 by utilising non-parametric 
methodology, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Malmquist total factor 
productivity index (MPI). Results revealed that total factor productivity increased in 
all eight banks except for EON bank, which remained the same whilst Public bank 
recorded a decrease in productivity. These findings were supported by Sufian (2004) 
in which he used DEA analysis and concluded that Malaysian banks achieved overall 
efficiency during 1998 to 2003, in particular the small and medium size banks. Liu & 
Tripe (2001) also performed DEA analysis on six bank mergers cases in New Zealand 
and found that most banks achieved efficiency gains post merger. 
 
Haynes & Thompson (1999) used a panel of 93 UK building societies over the period 
1981 to 1993 and noted significant productivity gains, apparently rising over a period 
of six years or more subsequent to the acquisition itself. Knapp et al (2006) studied 80 
mergers in US during the years 1987 to 1998. Results showed that bank holding 
company mergers do, on average benefit the shareholders of the acquiring bank. 
Acquirer is found to be more profitable after a merger. Diaz et al (2004) carried out 
empirical analysis of 181 acquisitions of European Union financial entities during the 
period 1993-2000. They observed acquisition of financial entities can increase 
profitability. There is a lag of at least two years between the acquisition and the 
increase in performance.  
 
Altunbas & Marques (2008) examined 207 domestic M&As that took place in the EU 
banking sector between 1992 to 2001. They noted improvement in performance after 
a merger had taken place. Houston et al (2001) took a sample of 64 bank mergers in 
US during the period 1985 to 1996 and observed that post-merger operating 
performance of the banks had improved via increases in average pre-tax return on 
assets.  
 
Pillof & Santomero (1996) pointed out that the research for post-merger performance 
gains in banks had focused on improvement in any one of the areas namely cost and 
revenue efficiency improvements, increased market powers, and value enhancing by 
raising the level of bank diversification via broadening the geographic reach or 
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increasing the range of the products and services offered. Greater diversification 
provides value by stabilising returns and hence raises shareholders’ wealth. In their 
studies on literature reviews on the value of banks mergers and acquisitions, on 
average there was no statistically significant gain in value or performance from 
merger activity. Amel et al (2004) also found no clear evidence that M&As result in 
cost reduction. They noted that empirical evidence suggested commercial bank M&As 
did not significantly improve cost and profit efficiency. There was general consensus 
that consolidation in financial sector was beneficial up to certain size in order to reap 
economies of scale. 
 
Avkiran (1999) analysed four cases of banks’ mergers in Australia. Though acquiring 
banks were more efficient than target banks, the acquiring bank did not always 
maintain its pre-merger efficiency. Hence, the role of mergers in efficiency gains was 
not necessary positive. However, they noted that in one of the banks’ mergers, there 
was a gradual rise in efficiency after the merger. 
 
Shih (2003) contended that merging failing banks is likely to create banks more likely 
to fail than the predecessor banks but merging relatively healthy banks is likely to 
create banks less likely to fail. He added that when banking sector is relatively healthy, 
there is no urgency for policy makers to strengthen the banking sector. During the 
1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, policy makers were likely to take interventionist 
measures, such as encouraging or forcing banks to merge. In this situation, bank 
mergers would likely create even weaker banks and worsen the banking sector crisis. 
 
Rezitis (2008) used a Generalized Malmquist productivity index on five merged banks 
in Greek and concluded that banks that participated in merging activity experienced a 
decline in technical efficiency and in total factor productivity. Hence, merged banks 
did not experience an improvement in performance. 
 
Cybo-Ottone & Murgia (2000) studied the stock market valuation of M&As in the 
European banking industry and noted that both acquirer and target banks had positive 
increase in share value at the time of the deal’s announcement. However, in a recent 
study by Bendeck & Waller (2007) on bank acquisition in US, it was found that target 
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banks earned positive returns whilst bidding banks sustained negative returns at 
acquisition announcement.  
 
A summary of literature review is appended at the end of this paper under Appendix II.  
 
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Selection of pre merger and post merger period 
  
Malaysian banking consolidation to ten anchor banks was completed in mid 2002 
with the final merger between RHB Bank Bhd and Bank Utama (M) Bhd. Banks were 
required to have minimum capital of RM2 billion by 30th June 2002. In this study, the 
pre merger period is represented by year 1999 to 2000.  
 
Most of bank mergers details were announced in mid 2000 and the last merger 
transaction was completed in mid 2002. Merged banks were not allowed to retrench 
employees for 2 years after the merger exercise was completed (Rubi Ahmad, 2007). 
With this restrictive action, banks are expected to achieve cost efficiency after 2 years. 
Rhoades (1998), Campa & Hernando (2006) and Diaz et al (2004) found that merged 
banks need at least 2 years to achieve cost efficiency or improvement in performance. 
Rubi Ahmad (2007) pointed out that a longer period of study should provide a better 
picture. Hence, I have selected the post merger period as year 2006 and 2007. 
 
3.2 Financial ratios 
 
There are three areas of analysis namely profitability, cost saving and maximisation of 
shareholders’ wealth or value. These are measured by financial ratios as follows: 
 
Analysis of  Ratio (s) used  
Profitability  : Return on Asset 
 
Cost saving : 
: 
Total expenses to total revenues 
Total expenses to total assets 
 
Shareholders’ wealth : 
: 
Earnings per share  
Dividends per share  
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Return on assets ratio reflects the ability of the bank’s assets to generate profit. 
Rhoades (1998) highlighted that net income (after tax) to average assets as an 
indicator of profitability and a good overall indicator of a banking organization’s 
performance. Instead of net income, I have chosen profit-before-tax as numerator to 
eliminate taxation effect on bank’s income. I opined that taxation treatment on banks’ 
earnings is a non reflection of banks’ capabilities to generate profit and should be 
excluded. 
 
Cost savings ratio is represented by total expense to total revenue and total expenses 
to total assets. Rhoades (1998) highlighted that revenue when used as denominator 
reflects the ability of the firm to generate revenue from its expenditure. He added that 
both revenues and expenses reflect interest rate changes whilst assets do not. 
Furthermore, off-balance sheet items can affect both revenues and expenses whereas 
expenses to assets ratio could be misleadingly high for those banks with significant 
off-balance sheet items. Nevertheless, ratio of total expenses to total assets would also 
be analysed in view that assets reflect the earnings base of the bank and they are 
generally not highly variable as compared to revenue (Rhoades, 1998). In this study, 
total expenses are the sum of interest expense, non-interest expense and overhead 
expenses. Total revenues are the sum of interest income, income from Islamic 
banking and non-interest income.      
 
The most appropriate measurement for shareholders’ wealth is the share prices of the 
banks. However, not all the banks are listed on Bursa Malaysia. Only Maybank, 
Public bank and Hong Leong bank are listed on Bursa Malaysia. Public bank’s share 
price had surged from RM2.94/share in 2000 to RM11/share in 20073. Market price to 
book value had jumped from 1.95x to 4.48x4. The surge in share prices could be 
largely due to better economic conditions and increased in performance efficiency. 
Before the merger, share prices of local banks were severely impaired by the Asian 
Financial Crisis. Better economic conditions in 2007 as opposed to year 2000 could 
have pushed the share prices to higher level. This reason could be applied to Maybank 
and Hong Leong bank whereby it can be conjectured that their share prices are higher 
                                               
3
 Closing share prices as stated in Public Bank’s annual report for year 2000 and 2007. 
4
 Market price to book value is derived from market capitalization over tangible net worth 
(shareholders’ funds less intangibles). 
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in 2007. Their share prices in 2000 could not be obtained as this information is not 
published in their annual reports. 
 
Local banks other than the three banks mentioned above are subsidiaries of listed 
holding companies. For example, CIMB bank is a subsidiary of Bumiputra Commerce 
Holdings Bhd; Alliance Bank, a subsidiary of Alliance Financial Group Bhd and EON 
bank, a subsidiary of EON Capital Bhd. Besides bank, these holding companies also 
have other companies, normally in the businesses related to financial services like 
insurance or investment banking in its stable. Hence, the movement of share prices of 
the listed holding companies may not reflect shareholders’ value of the banks. In 
addition, share prices of banks are largely influenced by market sentiment on 
economic conditions which may not reflect their true fundamental values. In this 
study, ratios like earnings per share (EPS) and dividends per share (DPS) of the banks 
are used as an alternative indicator of shareholders’ wealth. Higher EPS or DPS 
reflect greater shareholders’ value.    
  
3.3 Collection of data 
 
Data are collected from the respective banks’ annual reports for two periods ie pre 
merger (year 1999 & 2000) and post merger (year 2006 & 2007). Currently, there are 
nine local banks. Southern bank was acquired by CIMB bank on March 2006. In view 
of this acquisition that may distort its financial during the post merger period, CIMB 
bank is excluded from the study. Thus, there are only eight local banks in this analysis. 
 
3.4 Method of analysis 
 
Data like profit-before-tax, total assets, total revenue, total expenses, net income, 
dividend and number of shares of eight local banks are keyed into Microsoft Excel 
and ratios are then computed. Average ratios are computed for two periods ie pre 
merger and post merger. For example, average ROA in pre merger period is computed 
and compared with average ROA in post merger period. Increase in average ROA, 
EPS, DPS, and reduction of cost saving ratios are assessed as an improvement. Lower 
ROA, EPS, DPS and higher cost saving ratios are marked as weakened.  
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3.5 Analysis of findings 
 
The data and ratios of all eight banks are attached in the Appendix I of this paper. 
Results are summarised below: 
 
Profitability Cost Saving Shareholders’ wealth Banks  
ROA Expenses/Revenue Expenses/Assets EPS DPS 
MBB Improved Improved Improved Improved Improved 
PBB Unchanged Improved Improved Improved Improved 
RHB  Improved Unchanged  Improved Improved Improved 
AM bank Improved Improved Improved Improved n/a* 
HLBB Weakened Weakened Improved Improved Improved 
Alliance  Weakened Weakened Improved Weakened Improved 
EON Weakened Improved Improved Improved Improved 
Affin bank Improved Weakened Weakened Improved Improved 
*no comparable data 
 
Chart 1: Return on Asset Ratio
-3.00%
-2.50%
-2.00%
-1.50%
-1.00%
-0.50%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Maybank* Public Bank HLBB AM Bank* Alliance
Bank
Eon Bank RHB Bank* Aff in Bank*
*improvement in ROA
 
Only four banks showed improvement in ROA, three banks had weaker ROA and one 
bank exhibited unchanged in ROA. This implied that mergers in Malaysia do not 
necessary improve a bank’s ROA. Though Rhoades (1998), Houstan et al (2001) had 
found that most banks’ ROA had increased and Knapp et al (2006) concluded that 
M&As could contribute to bank’s profitability, Malaysian banks had shown mixed 
result. Four out of eight banks had improved their ROA while three banks recorded 
lower ROA, indicating decline in profitability level.  
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Chart 2: Total Expenses to Total Revenue Ratio
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Chart 3: Total Expenses to Total Assets Ratio
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The banks’ expenses to revenue ratio also indicated mixed result whereas all the 
banks showed improvement in expenses to assets ratio with the exception of Affin 
bank. As highlighted by Rhoades (1998), assets are generally not highly variable as 
compared to revenue. This could explain why the banks showed consistent results in 
expenses to assets ratio. Malaysian banks could have higher variation in revenue and 
when revenue-based ratio is used, results could be mixed as shown by the expenses to 
revenue ratio. Malaysian banks had achieved cost saving as measured by expenses to 
asset ratio. This supported the views of Rhoades (1998), Berger et al (1999) and 
Houstan et al (2001) but contradicts with Amel et al (2004). 
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Chart 4: Earnings per share (EPS)
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Chart 5: Dividend per share (DPS)
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Most of the banks had seen improvement in shareholders’ wealth as indicated by EPS 
and DPS. This finding is consistent with Lin et al (2006). However, it must be 
highlighted that Malaysian banking consolidation was prompted by the Asian 
Financial Crisis. The aftermath of the crisis had affected banks’ earnings. Hence, it is 
understandable that EPS and DPS during the pre merger period were generally lower. 
The economic conditions during the post merger period were no doubt better than the 
pre merger period and could have boosted the banks’ earnings. 
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4.0  LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
 
4.1  Time lag effects  
 
This study analysed the post merger performance efficiency of eight banks. The 
timing of post merger efficiency among the banks could have varied. Some banks 
could have achieved better performance in a shorter period and some may need a 
longer time frame. Theoretically, smaller banks could have seen the effect of merger 
in a shorter period as compared to larger banks. This is due to smaller asset size, 
lower duplication of resources in terms of staff workforce and number of branches, as 
well as lesser complications that could arise in merging smaller banks. Larger banks 
may need longer gestation period to realise their performance goals. 
 
4.2 Possible indicators from various financial ratios  
 
There are various financial ratios that could measure the banks’ profitability and costs 
savings. Besides ROA, banks’ profitability could be measured using operating profit 
margin, net profit margin, return on equity, total revenue to total assets and other 
ratios. Cost savings could also be represented by total expenses per employee and 
projection of expenses vs actual expenses. There is no definite answer which ratios 
are the most appropriate representations. In addition, using different profitability 
ratios may have shown mixed results that give inconclusive evidence. Selected ratios 
are at best used as proxy indicators only.  
 
4.3 Influence of external factors 
 
This study used four years of financial information data. The earliest is year 1999 and 
the latest is year 2007. During this nine years period, there are other events that could 
reduce the effectiveness of ratios comparisons like changes in management teams or 
major shareholders, liberalisations of financial services, intense competitions among 
the banks, economic climate, investment in latest technologies and other external 
factors. Changes in management teams or major shareholders could chart business 
directions that are different from predecessor management teams. In this study, 
economic climate between pre merger and post merger period were very different 
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vfrom each other. The pre merger period was recovery years post Asian Financial 
Crisis whereas the post merger period depicted full recovery of the economy. 
 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Brief review of findings 
 
Most of the empirical researches on M&As were driven by market forces. On the 
contrary, consolidation in Malaysian banking industry in 2000 was led and driven by 
the government. By comparing ROA in pre-merger period (1999-2000) and post 
merger period (2006-2007), Malaysian banks had exhibited mixed results. Cost saving 
as measured by expense to revenue ratio is also inconclusive. However, seven out of 
eight banks had achieved cost savings as measured by expenses to assets ratio. Most 
of the banks had increased shareholders value by using indicators such as EPS and 
DPS. This study has several limitations that could reduce the effectiveness of ratio 
comparisons namely time lag effects, possible indicators from various financial ratios 
and influence from external factors. The findings using ratios are purely indicative. 
Other ratios like operating profit margin, net profit margin, return on equity and total 
revenue to total assets, to name a few, could be used to measure the post merger 
performance of banks. 
 
5.2 Future research 
  
Further research could be undertaken to compare both the assets size of acquiring 
banks and target banks on the effectiveness of post merger efficiency. Lately, 
Malaysian banks are increasing their presence in overseas countries, mainly in Asia 
Pacific region by acquiring majority or strategic stakes in foreign target banks. It 
would be interesting to study the effectiveness of these cross-border acquisitions 
which I opined, is still at infancy stage and have not been analysed by any researchers 
yet.   
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Appendix I: Data and ratios of all eight banks 
   
          
          
  Maybank Public Bank HLBB 
Pre merger period 2000 1999 Average 2000 1999 Average 2000 1999 Average 
PBT 1,544 869   634 521   313 137   
Total Assets 97,057 87,592   32,305 30,898   18,506 15,095   
ROA 1.59% 0.99% 1.29% 1.96% 1.69% 1.82% 1.69% 0.91% 1.30% 
                 
Interest expense 2,573 4,078   863 1,112   443 707   
Overhead expenses 1,114 996   391 360   233 187   
Total expenses 3,687 5,074   1,254 1,472   676 894   
                 
Interest income 5,136 6,529   1,588 1,742   915 1,134   
Income from Islamic 93 70   20 15   4 -1   
Non-interest income 852 922   255 226   206 152   
Total revenue 6,081 7,521   1,863 1,983   1,125 1,286   
Expenses/Revenue 60.63% 67.46% 64.05% 67.31% 74.23% 70.77% 60.09% 69.54% 64.82% 
Expenses/Assets 3.80% 5.79% 4.80% 3.88% 4.76% 4.32% 3.65% 5.92% 4.79% 
                 
Net income 1,020 810   456 518   222 118   
Dividend 304 199   179 95   56 29   
No of shares 2,338 2,308   2,390 2,366   577 577   
                 
EPS 0.44 0.35 0.39 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.38 0.20 0.29 
DPS  0.13 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.07 
  Maybank Public Bank HLBB 
Post merger period 2007 2006 Average 2007 2006 Average 2007 2006 Average 
PBT 4,152 3,535   2,851 2,440   759 697   
Total Assets 227,447 197,135   158,471 134,267   66,161 55,139   
ROA 1.83% 1.79% 1.81% 1.80% 1.82% 1.81% 1.15% 1.26% 1.21% 
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Interest expense 5,273 3,849   3,712 2,955   1,716 1,399   
Overhead expenses 3,164 2,784   1,217 1,071   686 527   
Total expenses 8,437 6,633   4,929 4,026   2,402 1,926   
                 
Interest income 10,099 8,076   6,410 5,303   2,882 2,412   
Income from Islamic 846 860   478 428   0 0   
Non-interest income 2,448 2,179   1,254 1,077   439 450   
Total revenue 13,393 11,115   8,142 6,808   3,321 2,862   
Expenses/Revenue 63.00% 59.68% 61.34% 60.54% 59.14% 59.84% 72.33% 67.30% 69.81% 
Expenses/Assets 3.71% 3.36% 3.54% 3.11% 3.00% 3.05% 3.63% 3.49% 3.56% 
  
               
Net income 3,051 2,490   2,106 1,789   547 503   
Dividend 2,099 2,984   1,595 1,313   256 269   
No of shares 3,889 3,796   3,528 3,462   1,580 1,580   
                 
EPS 0.78 0.66 0.72 0.60 0.52 0.56 0.35 0.32 0.33 
DPS 0.54 0.79 0.66 0.45 0.38 0.42 0.16 0.17 0.17 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I: Data and ratios of all eight banks (Cont) 
          
          
  AM Bank  Alliance Bank Eon Bank 
Pre merger period 2000 1999 Average 2000 1999 Average 2000 1999 Average 
PBT 80 -630   156 72   86 68   
Total Assets 11,731 11,415   13,552 9,330   8,685 8,039   
ROA 0.68% -5.52% -2.42% 1.15% 0.77% 0.96% 0.99% 0.85% 0.92% 
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Interest expense 460 925   370 349   218 327   
Overhead expenses 102 91   194 123   124 105   
Total expenses 562 1,016   564 472   342 432   
                 
Interest income 690 999   822 645   460 511   
Income from Islamic 17 3   0 0   10 8   
Non-interest income 104 50   85 56   31 50   
Total revenue 811 1,052   907 701   501 569   
Expenses/Revenue 69.30% 96.58% 82.94% 62.18% 67.33% 64.76% 68.26% 75.92% 72.09% 
Expenses/Assets 4.79% 8.90% 6.85% 4.16% 5.06% 4.61% 3.94% 5.37% 4.66% 
                 
Net income 45 -465   108 72   61 61   
Dividend 0 0   0 0   0 0   
No of shares 379 348   395 230   1,168 1,114   
                 
EPS 0.12 -1.34 -0.61 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.05 0.05 0.05 
DPS  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  AM Bank Alliance Bank EON Bank 
Post merger period 2007 2006 Average 2007 2006 Average 2007 2006 Average 
PBT -574 252   156 -243   265 278   
Total Assets 53,584 56,359   24,338 21,688   35,638 34,499   
ROA -1.07% 0.45% -0.31% 0.64% -1.12% -0.24% 0.74% 0.81% 0.77% 
                 
Interest expense 2,009 1,308   498 486   1,061 980   
Overhead expenses 592 548   409 353   559 483   
Total expenses 2,601 1,856   907 839   1,620 1,463   
                 
Interest income 3,210 2,473   1,041 937   1,936 1,818   
Income from Islamic 0 0   125 67   0 0   
Non-interest income 283 149   154 152   331 284   
Total revenue 3,493 2,622   1,320 1,156   2,267 2,102   
Expenses/Revenue 74.46% 70.79% 72.62% 68.71% 72.58% 70.64% 71.46% 69.60% 70.53% 
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Expenses/Assets 4.85% 3.29% 4.07% 3.73% 3.87% 3.80% 4.55% 4.24% 4.39% 
  
               
Net income -460 264   112 -172   179 207   
Dividend 0 0   7 7   90 81   
No of shares 610 610   598 598   1,330 1,330   
                 
EPS -0.75 0.43 -0.16 0.19 -0.29 -0.05 0.13 0.16 0.15 
DPS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.06 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I: Data and ratios of all eight banks (Cont) 
       
       
  RHB Bank Affin Bank 
Pre merger period 2000 1999 Average 2000 1999 Average 
PBT 501 326   -100 91   
Total Assets 48,891 49,454   15,644 15,012   
ROA 1.02% 0.66% 0.84% -0.64% 0.61% -0.02% 
            
Interest expense 1,341 1,885   366 513   
Overhead expenses 617 357   268 232   
Total expenses 1,958 2,242   634 745   
            
Interest income 2,601 2,678   753 832   
Income from Islamic 19 13   34 28   
Non-interest income 312 362   109 129   
Total revenue 2,932 3,053   896 989   
Expenses/Revenue 66.78% 73.44% 70.11% 70.76% 75.33% 73.04% 
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Expenses/Assets 4.00% 4.53% 4.27% 4.05% 4.96% 4.51% 
            
Net income 330 308   -102 91   
Dividend 82 68   0 23   
No of shares 3,900 3,900   650 650   
            
EPS 0.08 0.08 0.08 -0.16 0.14 -0.01 
DPS  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 
  RHB Bank Affin Bank 
Post merger period 2007 2006 Average 2007 2006 Average 
PBT 1,022 715   251 218   
Total Assets 85,064 85,949   26,233 26,181   
ROA 1.20% 0.83% 1.02% 0.96% 0.83% 0.89% 
            
Interest expense 2,358 2,158   850 738   
Overhead expenses 1,166 1,111   462 396   
Total expenses 3,524 3,269   1,312 1,134   
            
Interest income 4,361 3,995   1,484 1,337   
Income from Islamic 0 0   0 13   
Non-interest income 748 669   223 185   
Total revenue 5,109 4,664   1,707 1,535   
Expenses/Revenue 68.98% 70.09% 69.53% 76.86% 73.88% 75.37% 
Expenses/Assets 4.14% 3.80% 3.97% 5.00% 4.33% 4.67% 
  
          
Net income 645 392   181 159   
Dividend 863 120   264 28   
No of shares 3,990 3,990   1,439 1,290   
            
EPS 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 
DPS 0.22 0.03 0.12 0.18 0.02 0.10 
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Appendix I: Data and ratios of all eight banks (Cont) 
 
  Maybank   Public Bank    HLBB   
Period Pre Post   Pre Post   Pre  Post   
ROA 1.29% 1.81%   1.82%* 1.81%*   1.30% 1.21%   
Expenses/Revenue 64.05% 61.34%   70.77% 59.84%   62.82% 69.81%   
Expenses/Assets 4.80% 3.54%   4.32% 3.05%   4.79% 3.56%   
EPS 0.39 0.72   0.20 0.56   0.29 0.33   
DPS 0.11 0.66   0.06 0.42   0.07 0.17   
 
  AM Bank   Alliance Bank   Eon Bank   
Period Pre Post   Pre Post   Pre Post   
ROA -2.42% -0.31%   0.96% -0.24%   0.92% 0.77%   
Expenses/Revenue 82.94% 72.62%   64.76% 70.64%   72.09% 70.53%   
Expenses/Assets 6.85% 4.07%   4.61% 3.80%   4.66% 4.39%   
EPS -0.61 -0.16   0.29 -0.05   0.05 0.15   
DPS 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.01   0.00 0.06   
 
  RHB Bank   Affin Bank   
Period Pre Post   Pre Post   
ROA 0.84% 1.02%   -0.02% 0.89%   
Expenses/Revenue 70.11% 69.53%   73.04% 75.37%   
Expenses/Assets 4.27% 3.97%   4.51% 4.67%   
EPS 0.08 0.13   -0.01 0.12   
DPS 0.02 0.12   0.02 0.10   
 
*concluded as unchanged basis in view of small changes. 
 
